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Abstract
In 2005, a fuel cell bus manufactured by the French company IRISBUS will operate in the
streets of Paris.
Under the French automotive regulation, IRISBUS is allowed to run its fuel cell prototype,
provided that it guarantees its safe operation. This task requires a risk analysis to be carried
out. INERIS has been chosen to drive this study. This paper reviews the risk assessment
methodology and results. It highlights that maintenance and use are the most critical stages
because of potential aggressions on the hydrogen system. It also indicates that the greater
hazard potential lies in high pressure hydrogen storage and distribution. As such, it appears
that more information is required on high pressure tank behaviour faced with different thermal
and mechanical aggressions. Beyond, thermal fuse reliability has to be known. However, this
bus features design principles and safety barriers that bring the risk down to an acceptable
level.
Introduction
IRISBUS is born from the joint venture between RENAULT and IVECO BUS. It launched a
project named CITYCELL which consists in running different fuel cell buses in 3 European
cities: Paris, Turin and Madrid.
The present paper concerns the French demonstration bus that will be operated by the Parisian
transport company, RATP . So as to run the bus in the French capital and carry public
passengers, IRISBUS shall get due authorisation from the French Ministry of Transport.
Since there is no specific regulation for fuel cell vehicles approval neither under the French
automotive regulation nor at a European level, IRISBUS was asked by decision makers to
demonstrate the safe operation of the bus for prototype approval.
INERIS has been tasked by IRISBUS to perform the bus preliminary risk analysis. This
analysis targets the safe use of hydrogen.
This paper will review methodology and the main conclusions in terms of risks and mitigation
techniques for the different running stages.
' Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens
ls Technical specifications
The proposed vehicle is a twelve meter articulated bus (see figure 1 below). It results from the
combination of a trolley bus (external electrical power supply) and a fuel cell system. The
power system is an hybridation between a 75 kW PEMFC and batteries. Batteries are a mean
to recover braking and deceleration energy. They also supply additive power for peak
demand.
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Figure 1: Trolley bus - The Civis Cristalis
The bus is expected to have an autonomy of 200 km. Seven 150 litres pressurised composite
tanks are used to store hydrogen. Tanks are made of an aluminium liner wired with carbon
fibre impregnated by an epoxy resin. They have a service pressure of 350 bar. The system
allows to store about 20 kg of hydrogen. All together, it weights about 580 kg.
Each tank is equipped with :
- a manual valve for hydrogen purging (maintenance),
- a thermal fuse to discharge hydrogen in case of fire,
- a safety valve.
The stack will be located at the rear of the bus. Tanks as well as high pressure lines will be
mounted on the roof.
Along with the bus, a urban hydrogen filling station will be experimented.
2. Regulatory aspects
Currently, vehicle approval refers to European directive (Council Directive 70/156/EEC on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the type-approval of motor
vehicles and their trailers).
This European directive does not cover vehicles running on hydrogen.
Meanwhile, under the same European directive, there are two ways for a manufacturer to run
its prototype on the street:
- The vehicle manufacturer can refer to its own national authorities to gain a prototype
approval. This prototype approval is valid as long as the number of vehicles is kept below
500 units per year. This national approval does not entitle to exportation unless the
European exporting country agrees with this approval. In this case, the vehicle runs with a
"W" type registration number. As long as the bus does not carry passengers, responsibility
falls on the manufacturer. In other cases, public authorities are responsible.
- For larger production and for innovative technologies, any national authority belonging to
the European Economic Community can submit a technical file to the European
Commission. If the evaluation output is positive, the approved vehicle will be allowed to
run freely within the 15 member states for a given period of time.
The first option is tailor-made for prototypes such as the present bus. Therefore, this option
was chosen. On the basis of a risk analysis, Ministry of Transports is expected to deliver due
authorisation.
Both options are interesting as long as prototypes or innovative vehicles are concerned. In the
longer term, the current legal context will slow down hydrogen vehicles commercialisation.
The European project EIHP aims at proposing an harmonised procedure for hydrogen
vehicles approval. EIHP proposals for liquid and pressurised hydrogen storage onboard
vehicles have been forwarded to an ad-hoc GRPE group in Geneva. International regulations
proposals are expected to evolve from this group.
3. Risk analysis : methodology
Proper risk analysis requires transversal skills and knowledge to be mixed. For example, this
project working group gathered people from conception (stack, bus and storage),
maintenance, as well as end-users along with safety experts.
Unfortunately, none of the participants was representing rescue services.
The graph below (figure 2) shows the different steps involved in the risk analysis.
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Figure 2: Logical steps in risk analysis
A risk analysis requires targets to be identified. In a second time, the system has to be
thoroughly described. Hazards inherent to the system as well as those coming from its
environment shall be identified. The use of past experience (conventional and CNG buses)
shall help in this task. Unwanted events that generate these hazards are referenced in a table
similar to the one shown below. This table also mentions unwanted events likelihood and
severity.
Function : hydrogen storage Date:
Product or equipment : tanks
N° Unwanted
event
Cause Consequences G Existing safety
measures
F Added safety measures G F
Table 1: Risk analysis table
Likelihood and severity criteria are set prior to carry the risk analysis (see tables 2 and 3).
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Table 4: Criticity matrix
Safety measures drive the system back to an acceptable risk level (white area in table 4). Both
number and type (procedures or technical measures) of barriers are related to the estimated
criticity.
Safety measures implementation follows usual principles that consist in :
1. eliminating the hazard (conception choices),
2. reducing the hazard (conception choices and safety measures),
3. mitigating its effects (safety measures),
4. and finally removing or moving potential targets away from the hazard.
Safety barriers are expected to comply with specifications such as :
- fail safe conception,
- ability to be tested and maintained,
- ability to withstand expected aggressions,
- ability to work in the case it suffers a default.
Finally, their conception shall rely on a proven technology.
4. Results and discussion
All running conditions have been studied. That is to say :
- the hydrogen filling stage,
- the bus maintenance and cleaning,
- the use of the bus with passengers in a urban environment,
- and finally the bus parking.
Tunnel crossing has not been looked at. The working group suggested that experience should
be gained before considering tunnel crossing.
The filling station itself is also out of the frame of this study.
To ease the study, the bus has been split into its main functions:
- hydrogen storage and supply to the stack,
- hydrogen conversion (air supply, electrochemical conversion, heat dissipation,
outflow management, . . . ) ,
- electrical architecture,
- vehicle.
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Table 5: List of unwanted events
The hydrogen filling stage
Hydrogen leakage is quite a likely event as large quantities of high pressure hydrogen are
transferred from the station to the bus. Besides, many situations can cause a leakage
(improper plugging, open gates, tearing of dispenser lines, . . . ) . Hazard associated to this
situation is connected to the leaking flow, its duration, as well as to hydrogen potential to
accumulate. Knowing the prone ability of hydrogen air mixture to be ignited, it is taken for
granted that ignition will take place. Indeed, industrial experience shows that adequate
hydrogen air mixture ignites most of the time.
Hydrogen release can be caused by a normal or abnormal opening of PRDs or safety thermal
fuses. These releases are collected in order to be vented in a safe location.
Bus fire can be the consequence of ignited hydrogen leakage, electrical default, maintenance
work, ... Fire is critical since it can eventually cause the burst of tanks. Burst of one tank can
induce the burst of the other ones because of flying debris. Tank burst can also release
sufficient energy to punch the passenger carrier compartment.
For safety reasons, filling takes place outside in a restricted access dedicated filling station.
Ignition sources are controlled through the use of adequate electrical equipment, prohibition
of work, switching of bus power sources, ... Hydrogen detection, pressure drop detection,
accidental disconnection, ... cause filling to stop in emergency. Finally, hydrogen flow is
limited and lines are fitted with check valves. Whenever, an explosion occurs the filling
station is located away from other industrial equipment and dwellings.
Maintenance and cleaning
Maintenance is one of the most critical stage. Indeed, it can imply to act directly on the
hydrogen distribution circuit in confined conditions. Confinement prevents hydrogen
dispersion and dilution. It is therefore liable to significantly increase explosion hazards.
Mechanical or natural ventilation prevents hydrogen from accumulating. However, it has no
effect whatsoever on the dispersion plume, which is linked to the leaking diameter and
pressure. Moreover, in a maintenance context, fire is a likely event (use of open flames to
facilitate mechanical dismantling).
Leakage on the low pressure circuit is not that critical because of quantities of hydrogen and
relative explosive volume that can be formed. This remark is valid, as long as the low
pressure circuit is isolated from the high pressure one. Local confinement also has to be
avoided.
Tanks rupture can be feared in case of inappropriate maintenance (drilling, open flames, . . . ) .
Drop of heavy loads carried above the tanks could also punch them.
Finally, attention should be paid when maintenance concerns safety equipment. Their working
conditions can be altered.
To mitigate explosion hazards, it has been recommended whenever possible to limit tank
pressure before to enter maintenance workshop. A list of critical maintenance work requiring
tank to be emptied has to be drawn. A bay will be dedicated to hydrogen bus maintenance.
This bay will have special features: control of ignition sources, hydrogen sensors, and
ventilation eventually.
High pressure lines are shielded against mechanical aggressions.
The use of the bus with passengers in a urban environment
In this situation, targets and hazards sources are numerous. Road collisions is one of them.
Experience shows that the 4 000 Parisian buses suffer annually about 10 000 accidents. Most
of these accidents concern the front right or left hand side of the bus. The low part of the
chassis is usually concerned. In a urban situation, many other aggressions have been thought
of: drop of objects from balconies, gun shot, falling trees, vandalism, ...
CNG buses are to some extend comparable to the hydrogen ones. Experience with the
53 buses operated in Paris for the last 3 years indicates that natural gas sensors went of
20 times. Too low triggering level and exhausted gases were responsible for all of these
detections. Once, a thermal fuse opened untimely because of friction between the fuse and the
tank cover.
Whereas in the previous stages emergency means were more or less ready for action, in a
urban context, it might take time for rescue services to intervene.
Besides, it turns to be more difficult to set a safety perimeter in case of an accident. On the
other hand, outdoor conditions enhanced hydrogen dispersion even though high buildings
may refrain secure plume dilution.
Massive leakage can generate an explosive atmosphere as well as jet flames. Thermal fuses
default leads to a leak that can not be stopped unless the tank is empty. Normal PEMFC
purging does not cause any hazardous situation knowing the quantity of hydrogen involved.
Explosive atmosphere within the passengers carrier compartment has also been identified.
This compartment is isolated from hydrogen equipment. High pressure lines are mounted on
the roof to facilitate hydrogen dispersion. Finally, on a precautionary principle, a hydrogen
sensor has been installed within the passenger compartment.
In case of a fire, the driver is expected to tackle the flames with a 6 kg powder extinguisher.
He also invites passengers to evacuate. Evacuation takes no more than 5 minutes. Knowing
the possibility for tanks to burst, a safety zone will have to be enforced. Time required for
passengers and public to evacuate the zone has to be assessed. Possible burst shall not take
place before this time.
Accidents can expose live parts. Circuit breaker and isolation means are used to prevent
electrical shocks to passengers or rescue services. Moreover, high voltage parts will be
tagged. Rescue services will be informed about specific explosive and electrical risks induced
by this new technology.
Flow limiter and small diameter piping prevent large explosive atmosphere volumes. Length
of high pressure lines is kept to a minimum. R110 rules will be followed. Leakage or
catastrophic rupture would induce pressure drop. Drop in pressure detection causes feeding
gates to shut off. Regarding the stack itself, electrical equipment are physically isolated from
hydrogen equipment. All these equipment are ventilated.
Finally, use of combustible material is controlled in order to prevent fire from rapid
propagation.
The bus parking
On a parking stand, internally or externally triggered fire is possible. As said before, fire can
ultimately be responsible for the burst of tanks. This risk has to be taken into account, while
getting the fire under control. The hydrogen bus motion shall not be bounded to other buses
position, in order to be able to move it freely if it is not on fire. Outdoor parking mitigates
potential explosive atmosphere volumes and effects.
Hydrogen gates shall be in a closed position and electrical parts shall be discharged as the bus
is parked.
The table below summarises most of the selected safety barriers for all stages.
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- Outdoor filling station
- Dedicated filling
dispensers
- Check valve on tanks
- Limitation of equipment on
H2 lines
- Welding check
- Safety filling pipe
- Training
- Prohibition of any
maintenance work during
filling
- Restricted access to the
filling station
- Control of ignition sources
- Filling is not possible if the
bus is running
- H2 detection, pressure
drop, disconnection,




- Safety distances with other
equipment
- Internal bus power sources
are switched off (H2 bus
sensors are kept in
function)
- Fire fighting measures and
equipment
- Evacuation procedures
- When possible limitation
of tank pressure
- Mechanical protection of
high pressure lines
- Training
- Tests of high pressure
circuit after maintenance
- Dedicated bay for
hydrogen bus maintenance
- Control of ignition sources
- Emptying of tanks for
heavy or timely
maintenance
- Hydrogen venting is




- Tag and lock procedure
- Discharge of electric
capacities
- Fume detection
- Fire fighting measures and
equipment
- Critical safety equipment
have been identified for a
specific maintenance
procedure
- Implementation of Rl 10
rules
— Length limitation of high
pressure lines
- High pressure lines are
located on the roof; they
are also protected
- Leaking flow does not
exceed 4 times stack H2
consumption
- Pipe diameter is minimum
- Pressure drop detection








- Tag of high voltage
equipment
- H2 detection in passenger
compartment
- Isolation between H2
circuit and passenger
compartment
- Tanks and high pressure
lines on the roof
- Use of non combustible
materials
- Gates ensure isolation of
tanks from high pressure
circuit
- Outdoor parking
- Ventilation of stack
compartment before start-up
- Discharge of electric
capacities
- Internal bus power sources
are switched off
- Freedom of movement
- Fire fighting measures and
equipment
- Evacuation procedures
Table 6: List of proposed safety barriers
Hydrogen storage and high pressure lines are the most hazardous part of the bus. Bursting and
leaking potentiality has to be better understood and quantified for all types of aggressions.
The following paragraphs discuss these events.
High pressure hydrogen storage : how safe is it safe ?
Jet flames, explosive atmospheres or burst of tank can be induced namely by:
- local (jet flames) or global thermal aggressions (bus on fire);
- mechanical aggressions (road accidents, falling objects, flying debris, gun shot, .. .).
The graph below illustrates some of the causes leading to unwanted effects.
Accident on a pressurized H2 tank
Leakage - Release of the content
eg : fuse leak - valve leak
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Figure 3: Tank accidental situations
Thermal aggressions
Thermal aggressions can ever be local (jet flame from an opened thermal fuse) or global (bus
on fire). Whatever extensive the aggression is, safety measures shall be taken to prevent tanks
from bursting.
For global aggressions, the following questions have to be answered:
- What is the likelihood for a thermal fuse to remain closed ?
- What is the influence of the fuse location in its ability to operate properly ?
- Is there any critical thermal flux for which the tank can burst before it is
depressurised ?
- In the event of thermal fuse failure, how long will it take for the tank to
burst?
Untimely fuse opening likelihood is also to be quantified. Combination of fuse reliability and
sensibility shall indicate how many fuses are to be fitted to a pressurised tank.
Some tests3 have shown that bursting can be induced by local aggressions. These tests
indicate once more that number and location of fuses should be adequately set. It also
underlines that tank structure must withstand the local aggression during the time required to
get its pressure down.
Tank bursting is not an acceptable event, unless either its likelihood is speculative or people
have sufficient delay to get themselves in a safe location.
J . CHAINEAUX, « Security of highly pressurised tanks equipping GH2 fuel road vehicles », Contract n°
13461-97-11 F1ED ISP F, november 2000
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• Mechanical aggressions
The safety study has shown that tanks can be submitted to various mechanical aggressions:
punch, shock, impact, crash, ... It is worth knowing tank behaviour to these aggressions. In
this particular case, tanks are located on the roof, that is the less vulnerable part of the bus.
Moreover, there are tightly linked to the chassis in accordance with RI 104 rule.
Regarding collision head on (collision with tunnels), tanks are protected by the chassis. A top
cover also protects them from sun light and minor mechanical aggressions.
Conclusion
This safety analysis browses all situations of bus operation. It highlighted that maintenance
and use are the most critical stages because of potential aggressions on the hydrogen system.
It also highlighted that the greater hazard potential lies in high pressure hydrogen storage and
distribution.
As such, it appears that more information is required on high pressure tank behaviour faced
with different thermal and mechanical aggressions. Beyond, thermal fuse reliability has to be
known.
However, this bus features design principles and safety barriers. They bring the risk down to
an acceptable level as long as high pressure tank safety equipment work as expected.
This safety analysis is the preliminary link of a safety chain that includes calculations on
potential explosive atmosphere volumes in case of line rupture or thermal fuse opening,
overpressures related to tank burst and related safety distances,... It also includes more
detailed AMDEC / HAZOP studies on the stack and the storage itself.
All together, it consists of the initial step of a safety program that includes:
- the check of critical equipment prior to be mounted on the bus,
- the set up of a database to collect defaults and incidents in order to improve
whenever required the overall safety level,
the definition of specific maintenance procedures,
- and finally the training of drivers, mechanics and rescue services.
This demonstration project should bring sufficient experience on bus operability, safety and
related public perception. Further use in tunnel for instance will then be considered.
4
 R 110 : Agreement concerning the adoption of uniform technical prescriptions for wheeled vehicles, equipment
and parts which can be fitted and/or be used on wheeled vehicles and the conditions for reciprocal recognition of
approvals granted on the basis of these prescriptions
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